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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (the GATT)1 concluded at Marrakech,2 opening a new era
in international trade regulation. The most visible product of this
Round was the replacement of the loosely organized and ill-defined
GATT with the more formally organized and newly empowered
World Trade Organization (WTO).3 The WTO symbolizes the water-
shed achievement of the Uruguay Round: the subscription to, imple-
mentation of, and adherence to all the provisions of all the agreements
constituting the GATT as a pre-condition to, and ongoing obligation
of, WTO membership. 4 In many ways returning to its roots in the ill-
fated International Trade Organization (ITO), the Uruguay Round
profoundly changed the way international trade will be conducted and
regulated by all countries around the world, regardless of whether
they are WTO members or not.
What has not been fully appreciated, but will prove to be just as
profound, is the Uruguay Round's impact on the private sector. In the
WTO environment, importers, exporters, multinational corporations,
or any business engaged in the movement of goods across interna-
tional borders (collectively referred to here as "traders") will be re-
quired to restructure the ways in which they engage in cross-border
transactions. In the WTO environment, traders will have an increased
responsibility because they will be charged with making initial legal
determinations as to the admissibility, tariff classification, and duti-
able value of the goods they import and export, instead of the largely
passive role of merely reporting to the Customs authorities the facts of
the transactions these traders have enjoyed in the past.6  This in-
1 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
2 Marrakech Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 33 I.L.M.
1165 (1994).
3 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
4 See WTO Agreement, art. XI(1).
5 See World Trade Organization, (last modified December 21, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/about/facts4.htm> (Setting forth a lengthy discussion of
the history leading to the establishment of the WTO).
6 The Uruguay Round Agreements do not specify specific responsibilities to be
assigned traders. As international treaties negotiated and signed by governments,
these Agreements enhance the role of trader by suggesting and prescribing what
national governmental authorities can do in the regulation of international trade. See
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
[Vol. 31:107
A NEW ERA DAWNS
creased responsibility will require traders to acquire or develop
knowledge, expertise, and policies that actively manage their respec-
tive international trade flows. But beyond increased responsibility, the
WTO-Uruguay Round environment presents traders with a tremen-
dous opportunity (never before presented) to develop customs and in-
ternational trade planning policies and strategies that will reduce the
cost and burden of international trade by taking positions that legally
reduce duty payments and implementing cost-efficient customs and
trade management programs. The new responsibilities and opportuni-
ties for traders presented by the Uruguay Round, under the aegis of
the WTO, are the subject of this Article.
Before getting into the substance of this Article, it is necessary to
describe some of the principles that govern international trade, the
context in which international trade historically has been conducted,
and the relationship between traders and governments. The first prin-
ciple is that international trade is inherently a governmentally regu-
lated activity due to the universal sovereign right of nations to control7
the flow of goods and persons across their borders. Exercise of this
sovereign power serves two important purposes: the raising of reve-
nue from customs duties and other import-related taxes and the pro-
motion and protection of domestic economic and social interests. The
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, General Introductory Commentary 2, Hein's No.
KAV 3778 [hereinafter Valuation Agreement]: "Where the customs value cannot be
determined under the Provisions of Article 1 [transaction value], there should nor-
mally be a process of consultation between the customs administration and importer
with a view to arriving at a basis of value under the provisions of Article 2 and 3
[comparative transaction values]." See id. Also, "no customs values shall be deter-
mined under the provisions of this Article on the basis of (a) the selling price in the
country of importation... (f) minimum customs values ..... See id. at art. 7, 2.
The actual transition of legal responsibility away from the customs authorities to
traders for legal decisions affecting the cross-border movement of goods is left to
national legislation either implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements or reform-
ing existing customs laws or both. See Mexico: National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers (Bank of America, 1996) (visited Nov. 28, 1998)
<http://www.tradeport.orglts/countries/mexico/ftbar.shtml> as an example of the
former [herinafter Mexico: Trade Barriers] and 19 U.S.C. §1484 as an example of
the latter.
7 See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 315-321
(1936) (providing a lengthy discussion of the distinction between sovereign power,
which relates to all external affairs of a nation, and which derives from the sover-
eign power of other nations, and domestic authority, which in the United States de-
rives from the people and the Constitution). Sovereign power cannot be subject to
domestic law because it preexisted and is superior to it. See id.
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second governing principle is that importing and exporting goods is
not a right, but a privilege, that can be lost if the applicable laws and
regulations are violated.
The sovereign right of nations to control their borders and the
revocable privilege of traders to import and export goods defines the
context in which international trade is conducted and establishes the
parameters of the relationship between the traders and the govern-
ments. In order to retain their privilege, traders must comply with the
rules and regulations imposed upon them by national authorities. Be-
cause historically it was the government officials who had, essen-
tially, the first and last word on what could be imported or exported,
the relationship between traders and the authorities has been charac-
terized by active, virtually unquestionable enforcement by govern-
ment authorities and passive, relatively unquestioning compliance by
traders. In many respects, strict control over trade regulation by gov-
ernment authorities has been made necessary by barriers to trade
erected by governments as the products of national political and social
policies. In order to better understand the advancements made possi-
ble by the Uruguay Round, this Article will first discuss three barriers
to trade: sectoral segregation,9 the lack of conformity among national
customs and regulated trade regimes, 1° and the lack of a meaningful
participatory role for traders in the regulated trade process.1
Mere compliance, however, should not be the only objective of
traders. As presumed profit seekers, the more important goal for trad-
ers in the international trade environment should be to minimize the
cost and burden of governmental regulation. Thus, the proper relation-
ship between government and traders should be one of balancing
sometimes conflicting interests: raising revenue and trade law en-
forcement on the part of government and minimizing the cost and
burden of regulation and enforcement by traders. This Article sug-
gests that the Uruguay Round made significant progress toward cre-
ating an environment in which this balanced relationship between
government and traders can be established. 12
In reading this Article, it should be kept in mind that much of
what is discussed has yet to occur. The three barriers to trade still ex-
ist in many WTO member countries, not because of a lack of com-
8 See id.
9 See discussion infra Part II A.
10 See discussion infra Part II B.
" See discussion infra Part II C.
i2 See discussion infra Part IV.
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mitment to abolish them as they are obligated by the WTO to do, but
because the barriers have been significant parts of these countries'
political, social, and economic structures for a long time and the
global standards that are to replace these barriers will be radical de-
partures from the methodologies and processes that have been em-
ployed to date.
Yet, it is the signs of progress and indications of the member
countries' sincere commitment to fulfilling their WTO obligations
that prompted this Article. Although progress on the part of govern-
ment authorities will be measured in years and not days, and in steps
and not great leaps, it is high time for the private sector to begin
making its own progress and changes to accommodate and take ad-
vantage of the regulated international trade environment created by
the Uruguay Round and overseen by the WTO.
I. THE THREE BARRIERS TO TRUE GLOBAL TRADE
During the modem era of international trade, which began at the
end of World War ]1,13 there have been three monumental barriers to a
true global trade regime: sectoral segregation, the uniqueness of na-
tional customs and trade laws, and the lack of a meaningful partici-
patory role for traders in the substantive process of determining what
and how goods move across borders. The signal achievement of the
Uruguay Round was the creation of an environment overseen by the
WTO that will lead to the dismantling of these barriers.
A. Sectoral Segregation
What this Article will call "sectoral segregation" 14 involves the
extraction of an industrial or economic sector from the overall na-
tional customs and regulated trade regime and the promulgation of
special rules and regulations governing both trade and investment in
that sector. Sectoral segregation followed nationalization policies
which typically involved the seizing of foreign controlled businesses
and enterprises, making them the property of the national government,
and running these businesses under political and social, but not neces-
13 See World Trade Organization, supra note 5.
14 This article distinguishes what will be called here "sectoral segregation" from the
generally recognized economic term "import substitution." Import substitution is
any trade policy designed to promote domestic consumption of goods over imports.
The purpose of sectoral segregation, on the other hand, is to develop and promote a
domestic industry that is capable of producing goods that can be substituted for im-
ports.
1999]
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sarily sound economic or commercial policies (such as full employ-
ment and promotion of industries that were deemed to be essential to
national pride and advancement). Nationalization caused foreign
capital and expertise to either leave or be banished from their former
host countries. In too many instances, nationalization proved to be a
disaster.15 Sectoral segregation was an attempt to reintroduce foreign
investment and know-how, while at the same time preserving national
control over the development of the country's economy and the con-
duct of foreign interests.
Typically, segregated sector programs offer incentives to attract
foreign investment and participation in exchange for meeting certain
conditions. Incentives, beyond permission to enter and sell in the do-
mestic market, typically include tax holidays, subsidized loans, fa-
vored access to land, and, most pertinent to this discussion, waived or
reduced customs duties and other import-related taxes or charges on
specified imports deemed to be necessary to the investment project. In
exchange, the national government requires the beneficiary foreign
investors to meet certain performance conditions, such as minimum
levels of capital investment and employment, types and amounts of
technology transfers, required purchases of domestic products and
services, and/or minimum amounts of exports. Sectoral segregation
often has achieved the goal of attracting foreign investment, both from
interests that had been in the market before nationalization and from
new sources, and so to that extent can be said to have been a success-
ful policy. 16
' See, e.g., V.S. NAIPUL, A New King for the Congo: Mobutu and the Nihilism of
Africa, in THE RETURN OF EVA PERON (Vintage Books 1st ed., 1981). (discussing
Zaire's experience with nationalism). Naipul's essay vividly describes how the Za-
irians' inability to maintain or repair the industrial equipment brought to the country
by European corporate personnel resulted in rusting hulks or vehicles and equipment
littering the countryside.
16 Sectoral segregation effectively directs foreign investment into those economic
and industrial sectors that have been favored and promoted by host national gov-
ernments. By segregating a particular sector of the economy, governments encour-
age foreign investment by signaling that these ventures have the ostensible favor and
protection of the government. This has great appeal to risk adverse private capital.
The converse is where a government attempts to liberalize its economy or simply
loses control over economic developments, causing foreign investment to drop off.
See discussion of Indonesian automotive programs, infra. Similarly, some speculate
that economic weakness in China will cause foreign investment to dry up, although
the government's ability to centrally plan the economy may mitigate this. China Is
Sticking to Its Official Forecast of 8 % Growth This Year, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 16,
1998.
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Because each segregated sector has its own set of regulations,
rules, and definitions and the segregated sector regime stands apart
not only from the national customs and trade regime, but from other
segregated sector programs as well, significant barriers to trade in the
form of lack of transparency and commonality continue to exist. For
example, the segregated sector program for the automotive industry
will differ not only from the normal customs and trade regulations for
automotive products, parts, material, and manufacturing equipment,
but also from the segregated sector program established for the textile
industry. Further complicating this scenario is the fact that the gov-
ernment agency that negotiates and approves the investment project is
usually not the same agency that ultimately regulates and enforces the
terms and conditions of the foreign investment project once it is un-
derway.
The typical process for getting approval for a foreign investment
project in a segregated sector is as follows. The foreign investor ap-
plies to an economic development and promotion agency, generically
called the Board of Investment (BOI). The BOI, a part of the Com-
merce Ministry or Department, receives the application and negotiates
the terms and conditions of the project. Even where the criteria and
conditions for foreign investment in a segregated sector are published
and appear to be well articulated and certain, experience teaches that
all benefits and conditions are negotiable. Once a project is approved,
however, regulation and enforcement become the responsibility of the
revenue and other policing authorities, such as the Customs or Internal
Revenue services, who generally will enforce the literal terms and
conditions of an investment project. It is not uncommon for the BOI
to negotiate and approve a foreign investment project without first
notifying and/or consulting with those agencies that will be responsi-
ble for enforcing the project. Because the segregated sectors stand
outside the normal regulatory and enforcement structures, the fate of
the foreign investor who encounters a question as to whether a com-
mitment has been fulfilled or an incentive will be realized will most
likely be determined by that agency which prevails in exerting itsWill. 7
17 For example, this author was told by a lawyer who practices in Poland that a for-
eign investment project was granted duty free imports of certain goods by the Polish
investment approval agency, only to find when the goods arrived in Poland that
Customs assessed and demanded payment of the normal customs duties and taxes.
Customs, under the authority of the Finance Ministry, told the foreign investor that
the investment agency had no legal authority to grant waivers or exemptions from
customs duty. Appeals to higher authorities within the Polish government were of no
avail.
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The application and approval processes and the regulation of seg-
regated sector foreign investment projects have numerous pitfalls that
themselves constitute trade barriers. The complete negotiability of any
term or condition lacks both transparency and continuity. There will
always be in the minds of participants at the very least the suspicion
that someone else, a competitor, got a better deal. In addition, the
disjunction between the BOI and the enforcement agencies creates a
lack of predictability for the foreign investor. Unfortunately, neither
the inability to know that the terms and conditions of a project will be
applied as negotiated nor the potential for surprise when a particular
term or condition is not applied as negotiated has proved a serious
deterrent to foreign investors entering developing and emerging mar-
kets for the first time. However, they have caused investors to suspend
or cancel a project that is underway.' 8 The ultimate loser is not the
foreign investor, but the country in which the project was to be
placed.
A.1. Case Study: Indonesia and the Automotive Industry
Indonesia's segregated sector regime for the automotive industry
is a good example of the retarding effect sectoral segregation has on
the development toward a WTO-conforming customs and regulated
trade regime. As a charter WTO member, Indonesia has an obligation
under the TRIMs Agreement 19 and Subsidies Code2 ° to phase out any
programs that violate the commitments made under the Uruguay
Round.21 For many of the reasons that most countries give for a seg-
regated sector regime, Indonesia attempted to implement an auto sec-
tor program in 1993 and (despite vigorous opposition from Japan, the
European Union, and the United States) sought to maintain it until the
WTO ruled that it violated WTO terms and it, coincidentally, col-
18 In 1996, General Motors announced that it was suspending all future investment
in Indonesia in protest of the changes to the automotive sector programs under
which GM had established itself there. See G.M. Cuts Indonesian Investments, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 1996) at D21. For a detailed discussion of Indonesia's auto sector
program, infra.
19 Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A,
reprinted in FINAL TEXTS OF THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 139 (Office
of the United States Trade Representative, 1994) [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement].
20 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WTO Agreement, Annex
IA, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS OF THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 229
(Office of the United States Trade Representative, 1994) [hereinafter Subsidies
Agreement].
21 See id. at art. 3; TRIMs Agreement, supra note 19, at art. 5, 2.
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lapsed under gross mismanagement during implementation. Indone-
sia's auto sector experience illustrates very well both the WTO's en-
forcement policies and procedures as well the flaws of sectoral segre-
gation.
In 1993, Indonesia adopted the so-called "1993 Incentive Pro-
gram' 22 for the automotive industry. The stated purpose of the Incen-
tive Program was "supporting and promoting the development of the
automotive industry and/or the component industry" in Indonesia.23
Where duty rates in the normal customs tariff regime for imported
passenger vehicles were 200%,24 participants in the Incentive Program
could import a certain number of vehicles and pay at most only half
the normal rate, 100%!25 For automotive parts, normal customs duties
were 100%, but Incentive Program participants could import parts
with a top duty rate of forty percent. In addition, a luxury tax of
between twenty and thirty-five percent (depending on the engine size
of the vehicle) that was imposed on all vehicle sales was waived for
vehicles sold under the auspices of the Incentive Program.27 The ba-
sic condition for participants was achieving prescribed levels of local
content in both vehicles assembled and parts manufactured in Indone-
sia. Actual duty rates payable for imports declined as the amount of
local content increased.28
The basic objective of the Incentive Program was to stimulate de-
velopment of the domestic automotive industry in Indonesia for both
vehicle assemblers and parts makers. 29 This objective was to be real-
ized through steadily increasing the levels of local content in vehicles
and parts sold domestically.30 Both vehicle and parts producers were
to be rewarded with lower duties on their imports as they increased
22 WTO Dispute Resolution Panel Report on Indonesia - Certain Measures Affect-
ing the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R
4-5 2.4 (July 2, 1998) (visited Nov. 28, 1998) <http://www.wto.org> (document
search) [hereinafter the Panel Report].
23 Id. at 340, citing Decree of the Ministry of Industry, No. 114/M/S/6/1993, 9
June, 1993.
24 Id. at 4.
25 Id. at 5.
2 Id. at 6.
27 Panel Report, supra note 22, at 14.
2' Id. at 4-5.
29 Id. at 340.
30 Id. at 4-5.
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their levels of domestically sourced parts and material. 31 However,
for the duration of both the Incentive Program and the National Car
Program, there was, in fact, very little local content available. Conse-
quently, the Indonesian authorities devised very elaborate formulas
for calculating local content and created unusual definitions of what
would be considered local content in order to compensate for the lack
of actual domestically produced parts and material 32 (while still
maintaining the appearance of requiring local content thresholds to be
met by Program participants).
Under the Incentive Program, the amount of import duty reduc-
tion depended on (1) whether the imported good was defined as a
"part" or a "subpart"; (2) the amount of local content deemed to have
been attained under application of an elaborate point system;
(3) whether the part was being imported for direct incorporation into a
vehicle or was being imported by a parts maker who would be per-
forming some additional assembly or manufacturing on the imported
element before selling the finished part to a vehicle assembler; and (4)
the type of vehicle, passenger or commercial, that was to be produced
from the imported part.33 The duty range for participating vehicle as-
semblers was as high as 100%, where the local content of the finished
vehicle was calculated to be less than twenty percent. 34 A local con-
tent level greater than sixty percent allowed the vehicle assembler to
import the remaining parts at no cost.
35
For parts makers, the definitions and formulas were even more
complex. Depending on whether the import was deemed to be a "part"
or a "subpart," the applicable duty rates ranged from 100% to zero
percent for parts (the same scale applied to vehicle assemblers), but
only from forty to zero percent for subparts.36 Yet, the required local
content for subparts was actually more generous, in that it was less
than the local content requirements for vehicles and parts. Subparts
could be imported for zero percent duty if only forty percent of the
finished subpart was locally sourced, as opposed to the sixty percent
31 Id.
32 Panel Report, supra note 22, at 7-8.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 5. Thus, by merely entering the Incentive Program, a participant could im-
port fully finished vehicles at half the duty rate applicable to non-participants, con-
ditioned only on the participant's promise to achieve at some time in the future a
level of local content.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 6.
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requirement for vehicles and parts.37  This deviation and resulting
savings in duties paid invited (at least in theory) manipulation by In-
centive Program participants. By building up all of the necessary
components for a vehicle from subparts, a finished vehicle that was
produced from nothing but deemed subparts could have sixty percent
foreign content that had been imported duty free! Moreover, people
involved in the Incentive Program have said that the local content
formulas for parts and subparts involved a point system-allowing
points for local labor used and giving weighted points for locally
sourced materials.38 Although overall local content was supposed to
be only material based, labor and other factors could actually contrib-
ute to achieving local content and thus get significant duty reductions,
while not really developing the domestic automotive industry at all.
The purpose of this example is not to provide a clear under-
standing of how the Indonesian Incentive Program worked, but to il-
lustrate its arcane and arbitrary complexity. In essence, the Incentive
Program established requirements and goals that could not be met.
The dilemma of the inability of the Incentive Program's participants,
who had critical commercial and economic needs for the Program's
benefits, but could never fulfill its conditions, caused both the gov-
ernment and the participants to manipulate and contort the program to
such an extent that the basic goal (development and promotion of a
domestic automotive industry in Indonesia) was never obtained and
could never have been obtained under the circumstances.
Beyond its particular failings, the Indonesian Incentive Program
manifests a basic flaw in all sectoral segregation: the complexity and
apparent arbitrariness of a program's rules, definitions, and levels of
enforcement give participants, foreign investors, and traders in gen-
eral the impression that no rules or standards apply at all. The rules,
standards, and definitions created for segregated sector programs have
37 Panel Report, supra note 22, at 8.
38 This author was told by people involved in the administration of the Incentive
program for private sector participants that, in fact, the Incentive Program was more
elaborate and complex than the Panel Report indicates. All of the elements of the
manufacturing processes (material and labor) for both parts and subparts were bro-
ken down and assigned point values. Each material was assigned points. Each com-
pleted part or subpart was assigned total point values that translated into a local
content percentage. For example, a brake assembly deemed to have twenty percent
or less local content would have six or fewer points. If it were deemed to have
greater than sixty percent local content, it would have ten or more points. Points
were weighted for those materials that were domestically available. Because the
points varied according to the domestic availability of material for the particular part
or subpart, actual local content was largely irrelevant.
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little basis in the fundamental principles of customs and trade law.
Rather, they are the artifices of politically motivated economic and
social policy. Because they make little business sense and often defy
rational economic interpretation, neither the government officials
charged with their implementation and enforcement nor the traders
who are subjected to these programs in order to conduct business have
any incentive to develop processes for their orderly administration and
adjudication. Sectoral segregation not only breeds incompetence and
corruption within its own sphere, but undermines the orderly and ra-
tional administration of the remaining customs and trade regimes.
The Indonesian Incentive Program, for example, could be consid-
ered to have been so complex and arbitrary that it not only under-
mined itself, but also undermined the application and enforcement of
the normal customs and trade regulation regime in Indonesia. Traders
are presumed to act in economically rational manners. That is to say,
they will conduct their business in such a way that their profit is
maximized and their cost minimized. In Indonesia, with normal cus-
toms duties of 200% for vehicles and 100% for parts, but duty rates at
half that and less under the Incentive Program, no rational trader
would import any automotive product under the normal Customs re-
gime. In such a situation, neither traders nor the Customs authorities
gain any experience or knowledge in applying the normal admissibil-
ity, tariff classification, and dutiable value rules to goods included in a
segregated sector. With many countries employing sectoral segrega-
tion, there is no economic or commercial reason for traders to develop
expertise in the global standards of tariff classification and valuation.
Because sectoral segregation does not necessarily even allow exper-
tise and acquired experience to be applied to more than a single sector
in one country, much less applied to standards or methodologies on a
global basis, traders have no incentive or reason to conduct their busi-
ness on anything but an ad hoc basis. A comprehensive customs and
trade policy is useless where sectoral segregation exists. This not only
adversely affects the trader (who cannot benefit from economies of
scale and uniformity of approach), but also weakens the effectiveness
of national customs authorities, who suffer similarly from the inability
to develop competency and professional expertise in customs and
trade fundamentals, primarily due to the myriad regimes they are
charged with administering.
B. Different Customs and Trade Laws for Different Countries
The barrier of sectoral segregation aside, a consistent global trade
structure cannot be achieved so long as the barriers of unique or ap-
parently unique national customs and regulated trade regimes remain.
[Vol. 31:107
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Derived from the sovereign right of a nation to control its borders,
countries historically wrote their own nomenclatures to describe the
goods that crossed their borders and devised their own valuation
methodologies to determine how much duty should be paid.39 The
problem for traders is obvious. A good that is classified one way in
one country, but classified differently elsewhere leaves the trader little
option but to accept without question or argument the classifications
assigned by each country. The same holds true for valuation. Al-
though not the focus of this Article, the uniqueness of national cus-
toms and trade laws also poses problems for national governments.
Although a government may gain some benefit either in duty revenue
or in other trade regulation enforcement from a unique classification
or valuation methodology, that country's exports will be subject to
exactly the same vagaries in other jurisdictions. Adopting common
standards, such as those provided by the Uruguay Round Agreements,
not only allows traders to benefit from economies of predictability
and commonality, but also reduces the arbitrary ability of national
authorities to discriminate or retaliate against goods from another
country.
In a mythic world where trade flows are mostly bilateral or lim-
ited to a handful of markets on a multilateral basis, the differing tariff
nomenclatures and valuation methodologies may be manageable for
both traders and national customs and trade authorities. Using the
classic international economic model of wool from England traded
with wine from Portugal, it matters very little that England classifies
wine as a spirit and not a grape product, while Portugal values wool
based on volume and not weight, because past experience will easily
inform all involved in this bilateral trade flow. However, in a global-
ized trade environment, where England's wool and Portugal's wine
are traded in many markets against a wide variety of products, the
variances become an opportunity for local customs authorities to clas-
sify and value imports as they will, and a disincentive for traders (in
response to the authorities' perceived capriciousness) to assist in an
accurate and consistent classification or valuation of the goods that
they trade throughout the world. With no common standards or defi-
nitions, a good can be whatever one wants it to be and of any value. A
39 See Peggy Chaplin, An Introduction to the Harmonized System, 12 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 417, 432 (1987) (overviewing the spectrum of different tariff no-
menclatures and their effect of hampering international trade); see also USITC, PUB.
No. 1400: CONVERSION OF THE TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES AN-
NOTATED INTO THE NOMENCLATURE STRUCTURE OF THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM 8
(1983). See Valuation Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 7, 2 (providing a represen-
tative list of the valuation methodologies utilized by various countries).
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vicious downward spiral is established. Some traders succumb to the
temptation to distort or misstate the information that they are required
to report to the governments. Governments, in turn, distrust the accu-
racy and truth of the information that they receive: a trader's descrip-
tion of the goods it has imported cannot be relied upon; the trader's
statement of price paid or cost incurred cannot be trusted. Ultimately,
there is no system or standard. Faced with an arbitrary and capricious
trading system, either the governments fail to collect the revenues due
them or the traders avoid such markets. Neither governments nor trad-
ers benefit from unique nomenclatures and valuation methodologies.
Confronted with inconsistent and widely varying rules in differ-
ent countries that apply to the same product sold by the same trader, it
is easy to see why even a trader with knowledge and experience
(even, perhaps because of its knowledge and experience in the pre-
Uruguay Round trade environment) would be unable or unwilling to
develop a comprehensive and consistent trade policy and strategy.
C. The Lack of a Meaningful Role for Traders in the Process of
Regulating International Trade
The final and (for traders) most significant barrier to a cohesive
global trade environment has been the lack of a meaningful partici-
patory role in the substantive process of international trade regulation.
Historically, the trader's sole responsibility has been to truthfully and
completely report the facts of the transaction, which generally was
discharged by providing a description of the physical nature and qual-
ity of the goods, quantity, price paid, and/or costs of acquisition or
production. 40 The substantive determinations of admissibility, tariff
classification, and valuation have been the exclusive prerogative of
regulators-the government authorities charged with administering
and enforcing the customs and trade laws of the jurisdiction.41
Even in those countries with a more inclusive process at either
the administrative or judicial levels, the trader has lacked a meaning-
ful role at perhaps the most fateful point in the customs process: the
40 Compare, for example, the current language of 19 U.S.C. §1484 which shifts
filing and documentary responsibility to the importer, Infra note 44, with the former
19 U.S.C. §1484, which, prior to its amendment under the Customs Modernization
Act, provided that: "one of the parties qualifying as 'importer of record' ... shall
file with the appropriate customs officer such other documentation as is necessary to
enable such officer to assess properly the duties on the merchandise [and] collect
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moment when the trader's goods cross the border. For many traders,
the right to protest or appeal a government's initial decision is as
useless, from a purely business efficiency perspective, as having no
role at all in the process. With the government making the initial legal
determinations, the history of post-entry review, both administrative
and judicial, has been largely the technical correctness of these deci-
sions, not an exploration of what the law envisions and allows.42 The
trader has little role, but to attempt to inform the arbiter as to what the
correct decision should have been. For traders or for any business in-
terest, this is not the most efficient or expedient way to influence a
transaction. The time, cost, and expenditure of other resources to ap-
peal those decisions made by government authorities will too often
not seem to be worth the benefit of proving the government wrong.
To compensate for being excluded from the process of making
initial legal determinations affecting their goods, traders historically
focused on practical ways to reduce the impact of the governmental
burden. A primary target has been reducing the time it takes for goods
to be cleared and released from Customs.43 The primary value pro-
vided by customs brokers, freight forwarders, and even lawyers to
traders heretofore has been the expediencies of compliance; that is
those services that reduce the time the time it takes to obtain release
of goods from Customs custody. These service providers, to whom the
majority of traders have entrusted all details of moving their goods
across borders, fulfill their customer's objectives by knowing the
practical details that will expedite Customs clearance, such as the re-
quired type and format of documents, electronic transmission of data,
and other methods of simplified communication. These services speed
42 See discussion of U.S. Customs "presumption of correctness" infra notes 120-21
and accompanying text.
43 In the Customs Modernization Act, Title VI of the NAFTA implementing legis-
lation, Congress authorized the National Customs Automation Program [hereinafter
NCAP] "to establish... an automated and electronic system for the processing of
commercial imports. For the first time, filing of entry information from a remote
location is authorized [as well as] the ability of an importer to file entries and pay
duties on a periodic basis." H.R. REP. No. 103-361 at 246 (1993). Since enactment
of the Customs Modernization Act, Customs and the U.S. trade community have
paid far more attention to operational reforms, such as "remote filing" and "recon-
ciliation" (periodic filing of entries and accounting for duties owed), than they have
to the legal reforms implicit in the new law. It is not at all clear that these efforts
have been justified. Congress has refused to fund the new computer systems that are
necessary to automate the import process envisioned in the Customs Modernization
Act. See Official: U.S. Won't Pay for Customs Update, J. OF COM. 1A (Oct. 30,
1998).
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up the decisions, but they do not affect the substance of the decision
made.
The post-Uruguay Round environment should introduce a balance
between the traders and the governmental authorities that has not pre-
viously existed. Because government authorities that regulate and en-
force international trade transactions have enjoyed for so long such a
distinct advantage over the regulated parties, the traders, in their
power to make all legally substantive decisions regarding cross-border
transactions, they often seem to have become inured to being the sole
arbiters of international trade issues. Introducing a balance in the re-
lationship between government regulators and regulated traders, under
the aegis of the WTO and the GATT Agreements and implementing
national legislation such as the Customs Modernization Act" in the
United States, will be tantamount to much needed reform in the de-
velopment and practice of the law of customs and regulated interna-
tional trade.
III. THE CUSTOMS AND REGULATED INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ENVIRONMENT UNDER THE WTO
The Uruguay Round changed the GATT not so much in sub-
stance, as most of the Agreements had been drafted and negotiated
prior to the opening of the Uruguay Round,45 but rather by giving it
(at long last) some teeth. As stated above, WTO membership is con-
ditioned on subscription without reservation to, full implementation
of, and continued adherence to all terms and conditions of all GATT
Agreements.46 The WTO Dispute Resolution process, established in
the Uruguay Round, reinforces this requirement. WTO members
can neither abstain from, nor ignore, dispute resolution decisions, as
they could under the GATT.48 If a WTO member either fails to par-
ticipate in the dispute resolution procedure or fails to comply with the
terms of a panel or Dispute Settlement Body decision, the complain-
44 The Customs Modernization Act is the popular name for Title VI of the North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (NAFTA), Pub. L. No. 103-
182 tit. VI, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) [hereinafter Mod Act].
45 The Harmonized System was opened for signature in 1983 and became effective
in 1988. See Chaplin, supra note 39, at 417. The Valuation Agreement, supra note 6,
began to be negotiated in 1974 and went into effect in 1979.
46 WTO Agreement, art. XI(1).
47 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
reprinted in FINAL TEXTS OF THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 353 (Office
of the United States Trade Representative, 1994) [hereinafter "DSU"].
48 Id. at art. 23.
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ing WTO member may suspend any concessions or benefits that were
extended by the complaining WTO member to the non-complying of-
fending WTO member.49 This Lockeian 50 solution appears to ensure
the WTO's continuing life and effectiveness.
While there has been a fair amount of discussion and analysis
concerning the Uruguay Round and the WTO as a significant devel-
opment of public international law, there has been virtually no discus-
sion or debate on the impact of the Uruguay Round or the WTO in the
arena of private international law and on private commercial interests,
i.e. the traders.51 In the post-Uruguay Round environment, as the
three barriers to global trade are dismantled and WTO members
gradually reform their customs and regulated trade laws, traders will
find increasing commonality in the substantive fundamentals of trade:
admissibility, tariff classification, and valuation. More significantly,
traders should expect to have increased responsibility and opportunity
in the substantive legal determinations involved in trading goods
across international borders. This section discusses how the three
trade barriers will be dismantled, the new trading environment created
under the WTO, and the traders' place in that new environment.
A. Sectoral Segregation Eliminated
A primary objective of the TRIMs Agreement and the Subsidies
Code is the elimination of sectoral segregation. TRIMs prohibits con-
ditioning approval and ongoing operating authority of foreign invest-
ment projects on certain performance commitments, specifically local
content.52 Similarly, the Subsidies Code prohibits, among other things,
41 Id. at art. 22.
50 John Locke in his Two Treatises on Government said that there exist two laws:
the Law of Society and the Law of Nature. When man breaks the Law of Society, he
is ejected into the Law of Nature. See generally, JOHN LOcKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) (1690). The WTO
achieves very much the same thing by removing its protective and restraining meas-
ures from non-compliant members.
51 Readily distinct from the fields of direct taxation, international direct taxation in
particular, where there is a rich and varied body of literature and numerous fora in
which the issues of the day are vigorously debated, there is very little literature that
theorizes, identifies, and analyzes issues, or proposes planning opportunities in pri-
vate customs and regulated trade law. What literature does exist is overwhelmingly
declaratory and operationally practical: statements as to what the law and regula-
tions say and what must be done to comply.
52 See TRIMs art. 2; Panel Report, supra note 22, at 339 ("The TRIMs Agreement
is not concerned with subsidies and internal taxes as such, but rather with local
1999]
CASE W. RES. J INT'LL.
the waiver or forbearance of revenue (including customs duties) as
incentives for achieving certain performance criteria, such as export
performance or local content. 53 Where TRIMs prohibits certain ab-
solute conditions on foreign investment,54 the Subsidies Code prohib-
its the incentive and condition system of attracting foreign invest-
ment.55 Because WTO members can no longer impose performance
requirements as a condition or in exchange for incentives, there
should no longer be any reason why certain economic or industrial
sectors remain outside the normal national customs and trade regime
of the country.
The reintegration of all economic and industrial sectors into the
customs and trade regimes of each respective country should result in
a reunified domestic legal and regulatory regime governing all im-
ports, exports, and other trade activities. In each country, a widget
will be a widget for all purposes. The reunification of the customs and
trade laws will ease the administrative burden on the Customs and
other trade enforcement authorities. Further, the elimination of multi-
ple and contradictory regulations should lead to a more consistent ap-
plication of the reunified law. From the traders' perspective, consis-
tent application of the law translates into predictability. Predictability,
in turn, arms traders with the ability to plan in advance their cross-
border transactions.
Although sectoral segregation will not disappear quickly and it is
highly probable that some WTO members may try to avoid this obli-
gation, the Uruguay Round deadlines and the WTO Dispute Resolu-
content requirements, compliance with which may be encouraged through providing
any type of advantage").
53 See, Subsidies Agreement, supra note 20, at art. 3.1. It should be noted, however,
that the Subsidies Agreement does not prohibit reduction or elimination of duties or
taxes. In fact, a primary objective of the GATT has been and continues to be the
reduction of tariffs worldwide. Under the GATT, no member country may increase
their duty rates above the levels committed to in the Uruguay Round. Where a
country determines that increased revenues are required by current circumstances, as
Thailand, India, and Brazil have recently done, duty surcharges may be imposed, but
only on a temporary basis. These surcharges are subject to WTO monitoring and
compliance with WTO rules and conditions.
54 Id. at art. 3.; Panel Report, supra note 22, at 331-32 ("[T]he SCM Agreement
prohibits subsidies which are conditional on export performance and on meeting
local content requirements...").
5 See, Subsidies Agreement, supra note 20, at art. 3.
56 After all, for many countries sectoral segregation has become ingrained into their
economic structure and policy. In a well publicized case, Canada is currently de-
fending its "Auto Pact" provisions, which give duty preferences and other fiscal
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tion process ensure that sectoral segregation eventually will be dis-
mantled entirely. Indonesia's recent experience in the WTO Dispute
Settlement process is one of the early examples.
A.1. Case Study Part II: Indonesia's National Car Program
In 1996, Indonesia launched the National Car Program5 7 that ef-
fectively eclipsed the 1993 Incentive Program.58 The stated goal of
the National Car Program was to "build and produce a national car"
59
for the purpose of "improving the nation's self-reliance." 60 Under the
Program criteria, the one entity that:
(1) was "owned by national industrial enterprises or Indonesian corpo-
rations, the shares of which are wholly owned by Indonesian citizens,"
(2) would use "a brand name... never [before] registered in Indonesia
and owned by Indonesian citizens" and (3) whose product was to be
"developed with technology, construction, design, and engineering
based on national capability applied by stages"
61
would be designated the "pioneer" company with the privilege of pro-
ducing a national car for Indonesia. 62 The first two criteria effectively
eliminated most foreign auto makers either already operating in Indo-
nesia or potentially entering it, because few Western corporations
would risk having no direct equity stake in a venture, nor would they
readily abandon brand names that they have spent significant time and
money to develop and establish.63
Indonesia awarded PT Timor Putra Nasional (TPN),64 a joint
venture between one of former President Suharto's sons, "Tommy"
Suharto and the now bankrupt Kia Motors of Korea as the "Pioneer"
incentives to companies that have motor vehicle assembly and manufacturing op-
erations in Canada, at the WTO against complaints from Japan and Europe. Canada
Vows to Defend Auto Tariff to WTO, J. oF CoM. 6A (Aug. 24, 1998).
57 See Panel Report, supra note 22, at 9.
5 See id.
59 Id. at 341, citing Decision of the State Minister for the Mobilization of Invest-
ment Funds/Chairman of the Capital Investment Coordinating Board, No.
02/SK/1996 (Mar. 5, 1996).
60 Id. at 341, citing Presidential Decree No. 42 (June 4, 1996) (Concerning the Pro-
duction of National Automobiles).
61 Id. at 10, citing Minister of Industry and Trade Decree No. 31/MPP/SK/2/1996.
62 See id.
63 Conclusions based on the author's professional experience.
64 See Panel Report, supra note 22, at 12.
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company.65  Assuming satisfaction of the performance conditions
(which, as with all such programs, necessarily follows the extension
of certain benefits, such as duty free imports of parts and material),
TPN was allowed to import parts and material necessary to assemble
the vehicles duty free.66 In addition, the luxury tax would be waived. 67
In fact, the only requirement that TPN satisfied was branding the car
sold in Indonesia as the "Timor."6 8 The vehicle itself was none other
than the Kia "Sephia." 69 With a few strokes of the pen to the author-
izing decrees, TPN was allowed to have the Timor/Sephia produced at
Kia's factory in Korea and exported, fully assembled, to Indonesia,
where it was imported "free of duty and luxury tax" !70
Japan, the European Union, and the United States all filed com-
plaints with the WTO, alleging that the National Car Program violated
Articles I and III of the GATT, the TRIMs, and the Subsidies Code.71
The WTO heard a consolidated complaint after bilateral consultations
failed with all three countries and Indonesia had exhausted its one-
time veto against establishing a Dispute Resolution Panel.72 The
WTO Panel ruled against Indonesia.73
The Panel ruled that both the automotive decrees of 1993-1995
and the National Car Program violated TRIMs because of the local
content requirement.74 Although all three complainants alleged that
the National Car Program also violated Article Ill of the GATT, the
Panel concluded that, for reasons of judicial economy, it did not need
to reach that issue since its finding that the National Car Program
violated TRIMs effectively satisfied the complaints.75
Unfortunately for those interested in seeing how truly effective
the WTO will be on hotly contested issues, the economic crisis in
Asia, of which Indonesia has been one of the most prominent victims,
the resultant downfall of the Suharto regime and family, and Kia's
65 See id.
66 See id. at 11.
67 See id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 12.
70 See Panel Report, supra note 22, at 13.
71 See id. at 1 (Japan); see id. (EU); see id. (U.S.).
72 See id. at 2.
73 See id. at 401.
74 See id.
75 See Panel Report, supra note 22, at 346.
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bankruptcy overshadowed and effectively upstaged the WTO deci-
sion. In a last-ditch attempt to forestall the proceedings, Indonesia
notified the WTO panel that the National Car Program had been can-
celed because of the Asian economic crisis. 76 Nevertheless, in a trib-
ute to integrity of process, the Panel decided to proceed and issue a
report and recommendation to the Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) on
the grounds that the Panel Report and findings would be relevant in
the implementation phase of the Dispute, should that become ieces-
sary.
77
The significance of the Panel Report goes far beyond Indonesia's
treatment of the automotive industry. It is an articulate and compre-
hensive statement demonstrating how sectoral segregation violates
WTO rules and the actual scope and applicability of the GATT
Agreements. For example, the Panel concluded that TRIMs applies to
any investment-related measure, not just measures relating to foreign
investment. 78 Moreover, the Panel ruled, since TRIMs prohibits ab-
solutely local content requirements, the nature of any benefit or in-
centive granted in exchange for local content is irrelevant. 79 The
Panel Report will serve as valuable precedent for determining whether
any segregated sectors violate a country's WTO commitments and
obligations.
B. Harmonization of Standards of Classification and Valuation
The elimination of sectoral segregation is a critical step toward
the harmonization and reunification of national customs and trade
regulatory regimes. A comprehensive global trade structure will con-
tinue to be elusive, however, as long as the customs and trade laws of
each country remain unique unto themselves. To overcome this chal-
lenge, national customs and trade authorities must refresh themselves
with the fundamentals of importing: admissibility, classification, and
valuation, with particular emphasis on the latter two. Specifically, the
International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description
and Coding System,8 0 commonly known as the Harmonized System
(HS), 81 to which all WTO members are signatories, is the global stan-
76 See id. at 15.
77 See id. at 326.
78 See id. at 339.
7' See id.
so See International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System, June 14, 1983, Hein's No. KAV 2260 [hereinafter HS].
81 id.
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dard for tariff classification. 82 Article VII of the GATT, commonly
referred to as the "Valuation Code," 83 is the global standard for de-
termining dutiable value. As these two standards become more widely
adopted into national legislation by WTO members, and perhaps more
important, put into practice among WTO member authorities, the inef-
ficiencies and weaknesses of nationally unique customs laws will dis-
appear.
The use of a common nomenclature has not been a significant
issue as most countries have used the HS or its predecessor, the Brus-
sels Nomenclature 84 for some time. What has become of increasing
concern, however, is the lack of a common approach to classification
among the governmental authorities of the global trading community.
That every country uses the same terminology is of little consequence
if the terms used mean different things in different countries.8 The
most important elements of the HS are the General Rules of Interpre-
tation (GRIs), which set forth guidelines for how classification deci-
sions are to be made,86 and the Section and Chapter Notes, which es-
tablish rules of classification for the commodity groupings and sub-
groupings in the HS.87 The GRIs and the Notes should be regarded as
keys to the HS code. They decipher the assigned commodity codes
and they guide the user to the correct heading for a particular com-
modity. Of equal importance are the supporting materials: (1) the Ex-
planatory Notes, which are the official commentary to the HS, ex-
plaining by illustrative example and explanation what is to be classi-
fied where;88 (2) the Commentary by the Technical Committee, a se-
ries of opinions on specific classification issues written by a commit-
tee of classification experts (all Customs officials) from HS signatory
82 See Edwin A. Vermulst, EC Customs Classification Rules: Should Ice Cream
Melt?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1241, 1245 (Summer 1994), citing CUSTOMS COOP-
ERATION COUNCIL, INTRODUCING THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
HARMONIZED COMMODITY DESCRIPTION AND CODING SYSTEM 25 (1989).
83 See Valuation Agreement, supra note 6.
84 Convention on Nomenclature for the Classification of Goods in Customs Tariffs,
done December 15, 1950, 347 U.N.T.S. 127 (1950) [hereinafter Brussels Nomen-
clature].
85 See Vermulst, supra note 82 for discussion and commentary by a European
Customs practitioner of how the European Union has used "creative interpretations"
of tariff classifications to avoid GATT commitments.
86 See HS, supra note 80, General Rules of Interpretation.
87 See HS, supra note 80, GRI 1.
88 Customs Cooperation Council, Explanatory Notes to the Harmonized System.
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countries;8 9 and (3) the Compendium of Classification Opinions,
which is a collection of classification rulings issued by various HS
subscribing national customs authorities. 90 The aggregate provides a
comprehensive system for national customs authorities to use in tariff
classification. Ultimately, traders should expect to encounter only mi-
nor deviations or insignificant conceptual differences in the tariff
classification of their goods in every country in which they trade.
The HS is not immune to either grossly varying interpretation or
outright manipulation by even the most technically competent of cus-
toms authorities. The U.S. classification of drilled wood studs by the
U.S. Customs Service is a good example. Soft wood lumber from
Canada has been subject to a Countervailing Duty (CVD) order in the
United States since 1992.91 "Pre-drilled" studs, which are building
studs with a hole drilled at one end to allow installation of electrical
wiring or plumbing, were initially thought to be within the scope of
the Order. 2 While tariff headings are used as references to assist
Customs in determining what goods are subject to dumping or coun-
tervailing orders, tariff headings are not binding in dumping or coun-
89 WCO Technical Committees (visited Nov. 28, 1998) <http:/www.wcoomd.org/
frmpublic.htm >.
90 The inclusion of these national rulings in the Compendium signifies the Techni-
cal Committee's approval of the approach and methodology taken by issuing na-
tional customs authority. This resource will be increasingly important, particularly
for traders, as they become more involved in the substantive process of classifica-
tion. To be able not only to cite to a reference source as authority for a particular
classification, but to be able to say that another Customs jurisdiction has actually
applied the classification often should be persuasive to even a skeptical Customs
official. Id.
9' Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber
from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570 (1992).
92 Revocation of Ruling Letter Relating to Tariff Classification of Drilled Softwood
Studs, Customs Bulletin and Decisions, vol. 32, no. 26 (Jul. 1, 1998), available at
1998 WL 388359 (Customs). Classification of the drilled studs under HTS heading
4407, which provides for "wood, sawn or chipped lengthwise," would have been
included in the scope of the CVD order, while classification under HTS heading
4418, which provides for, among other things, "builder's joinery and carpentry of
wood" would not have been within the scope of the CVD order. Id. at 7-8.
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tervailing duty cases. 93 It is the description of the commodity in the
final order that is binding. 94
On the ground that the Order description of the softwood lumber
within the scope of the Order was not precise enough to clearly in-
clude pre-drilled studs within the Order, importers requested a ruling
from the U.S. Customs Service, as the government agency with dele-
gated competency to make tariff classification decisions, that drilled
studs should be classified under HTS 4418.90.4040 as "builder's join-
ery and carpentry of wood. 9 5 An affirmative ruling would have ex-
cluded these drilled studs from the scope of the CVD order.96 Real-
izing the sensitivity of their decision, U.S. Customs consulted with
their counterparts in several countries, including Japan and Austra-
lia.97 These authorities agreed that the pre-drilled studs were properly
classified as other building materials and U.S. Customs issued a ruling
to that effect. 98 However, the domestic industry association that had
obtained the CVD order strongly objected to the ruling, claiming that
it circumvented both the CVD order and an agreement reached be-
tween Canada and the United States for implementing the Order.99 In
June 1998, U.S. Customs revoked the original ruling and issued a sec-
ond ruling that the drilled studs were classified under HTS
4407.10.0015, which placed these Articles back within the scope of
the Softwood from Canada CVD order.'00
The second ruling can be justified under the HS GRIs, Notes, and
supporting materials. However, the consensus reached by U.S. Cus-
93 See Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood
Lumber from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,570-4 ("although the HTS subheadings are
provided for convenience and customs purposes, our written description of the scope
of this proceeding remains dispositive").
94 Id.
'5 See New York Ruling Letter B81564 (Feb. 18, 1997), available in WL 335949
(Customs).
96 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber
from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,570.
97 This is based on an unattributable conversation in Oct. 1997 between the author
and a U.S. Customs official who was involved in this matter.
98 See Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood
Lumber from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,570.
99 Court Suit Expected Over Lumber Ruling, J. OF COM. 3A (Jun. 26, 1998).
10o Id.; see Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood
Lumber from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,570. Customs revocation was affirmed by
U.S. Court of International Trade in American Bayridge Corp. v. United States, Ct.
Int'l Trade, no. 98-08-02682, slip op. 98-166 (Dec. 16, 1998).
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toms with its international colleagues strongly suggests that the origi-
nal classification was either the correct result or, at the very least, the
result that most other Customs authorities would have reached under
normal circumstances. Moreover, the reversal by U.S. Customs of its
original ruling casts the United States in a particularly bad light in the
international Customs arena as it was U.S. Customs that initiated the
consultation in the first place.
Subscription and adherence to both the Valuation Code and the
Valuation Agreement is a condition and obligation of WTO member-
ship. 101  The Valuation Agreement prescribes a restrictive list of
methodologies to determine dutiable value 10 2 and a strict hierarchy for
applying those methodologies.10 3 It also explicitly prohibits certain
valuation methodologies. 104 Because it has been so carefully drafted
and structured, there is little room for misunderstanding or misinter-
preting the basic elements of dutiable value under the Valuation Code.
For those relatively few points in the Valuation Code where ei-
ther there is a degree of ambiguity or the specificity of the language
does not go far enough, I0 5 a body of supporting materials, analogous
to those supporting the HS, are available. The Valuation Code man-
dates a Technical Committee, composed of governmental delegates
from WTO member countries, which drafts interpretive notes and
opinions to be used by the valuation branches of national customs
authorities.10 6 In addition, there is a Compendium of Valuation Opin-
ions, a collection of valuation rulings and opinions from various
countries that apply the Valuation Code. 107 Inclusion in the Valuation
Compendium connotes the Technical Committee's approval that a na-
tional customs authority's valuation ruling conforms with and prop-
erly explicates the Valuation Code. Thus it serves as a handbook both
for national customs authorities with less experience on the issues and
for traders.
108
A very significant part of the Valuation Code for traders is Arti-
cle 11, which requires that all national implementing legislation pro-
101 See WTO Agreement, art. XI(1).
102 See Valuation Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 7.
'03 See id., General Introductory Commentary.
104 See id. at art. 7(2).
105 E.g., the deductibility from dutiable value of "commissions." See id. at art. 8
l(a)(i)) or the exact definition of "assist." Id. at art. 8(1)(b).
'06 See id. at art. 18(2).
107 Customs Cooperation Council, Customs Valuation (2nd ed., 1997).
108 Id.
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vide a process for appealing valuation determinations. 9 Although
providing an administrative appeal is optional, judicial review is man-
datory.'11 Furthermore, for whatever appellate review is provided, the
decisions of the body or bodies must be provided to the appellant in
writing, along with notification of any further rights, if any. 11' Al-
though the Valuation Code does not require that the trader be pro-
vided a role in the initial valuation determination, it does assure, at
least, a meaningful role for the trader in the review of the decision.
Although not completely satisfactory from the perspective of business
efficiencies, it is a significant improvement over no substantive role at
all.
This right, however, also imposes a big responsibility on the
trader in the sense that in order to make a meaningful appeal, the
trader must understand the law of the Valuation Code. The Valuation
Code's restrictions of applicable valuation methodologies and the ex-
act sequence of the methodologies are to be applied to traders as they
are to the Customs authorities. Thus, for a trader to make a successful
appeal, a thorough understanding of the legal substance of the Valua-
tion Code is an essential pre-requisite.
While this may seem obvious in other contexts, involvement in
the law of customs and regulated international trade in all countries is
new for traders. The weight of past experience in most jurisdictions,
where traders have been subject to the decisions, reasonable or arbi-
trary, of the local Customs authorities, cannot be underestimated. The
Valuation Code and Agreement, perhaps more than the HS because of
the express provision of the right to appeal in the Valuation Agree-
ment, gives all traders throughout the WTO constituency a tool that,
prior to the Uruguay Round, they had available only on a very limited
basis.
The HS and the Valuation Agreement together provide a compre-
hensive system for tariff classification and duty valuation, supported
by extensive explanatory and precedential materials for both national
customs authorities and traders. With these two global standards, na-
tional uniqueness of fundamental customs principles should become a
thing of the past. The HS and Valuation Agreement provide the means
for consolidating and simplifying national customs and trade regula-
tory regimes, as well as providing the opportunity to develop knowl-
edge in the principles and rules of classification and valuation. For
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traders, the HS and Valuation Agreement will introduce a degree of
predictability and certainty in their trading of goods that has never
before been experienced by them.
IV. A MEANINGFUL ROLE FOR TRADERS IN THE SUBSTANTiVE PROCESSES
OF REGULATED ThTERNATIONAL TRADE EMERGES
The final barrier to an effective global trade structure has been
the lack of a meaningful role for traders in the substantive legal proc-
ess applied to goods that cross international borders, i.e., the customs
process. Traders will define "meaningful" as the opportunity to le-
gally reduce the amount of customs duties and other import-related
taxes that are paid as well as to minimize the administrative and op-
erational burden imposed by customs and trade regulation. As sug-
gested above, the right to appeal, in the few circumstances where that
right is afforded, is not meaningful enough. Business efficiency and
effectiveness in international trade demand that traders have some role
in all aspects of the legal determinations that are made on goods
crossing international borders. Traders must have the right, and re-
sponsibility, to participate in the initial determinations of admissibil-
ity, classification, and valuation, as well as the right to appeal each of
these determinations. This Article suggests that the Uruguay Round
and the WTO structure have created the opening for the establishment
of those rights. A few jurisdictions, including the United States, have
begun to allow traders this meaningful role in the customs process.
The challenge is to spread this opportunity to all WTO members.
The Customs Modernization Act in the United States (the "Mod
Act"), enacted in December, 1993 as part of the NAFTA, n1 2 is a good
example of the new substantive legal role in the customs process that
has been afforded traders. Under the Mod Act, the burden for making
initial determinations as to the admissibility, classification, and
valuation of goods imported into the United States has been shifted
from U.S. Customs to the importer.1 13 This shift in burden, while
clearly imposing a serious responsibility on the importer, also creates
an opportunity for the trader to exert a significant degree of control
over the customs treatment, in terms of duties paid and the compli-
ance burden imposed on the trader's goods. Moreover, the importer's
112 See Mod Act, supra note 44.
113 19 U.S.C. §1484 (1998) (as amended under the Customs Modernization Act).
"[O]ne of the parties qualifying as "importer of record". . . shall, using reasonable
care ... complete the entry by filing with the Customs Service the declared value,
classification and rate of duty applicable to the merchandise . . . ." 19 U.S.C.
§ 1484(a)(1)(B) (1998).
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new responsibilities under the Mod Act introduce some measure of
balance in the relationship between the trader and Customs that before
this has not been present.
The importer's sole responsibility prior to the Mod Act was to
accurately and completely report the facts of the transaction. Customs
made both the initial and final determinations of admissibility, classi-
fication, and valuation. Under the Mod Act, however, the importer not
only must know and declare the facts of the transaction, but also un-
derstand the legal relevance of those facts to the transaction, and make
legal determinations of admissibility, classification, and valuation." 14
Customs is responsible for the final determinations," 5 although the
importer has the right to administrative and judicial appeal for all is-
sues.
116
The express intent of Congress in passing the Mod Act was to re-
lieve Customs' work load by putting their enforcement responsibility
on a post hoc, audit basis, similar to that of the Internal Revenue
Service.' 1 7  A byproduct of the Mod Act, however, was an almost
revolutionary restructuring of the legal relationship between Customs
and importers in the United States. The Mod Act requires importers to
know and understand the law. Their initial import entry determina-
tions will reflect their understanding. But, as with almost any statute
anywhere, the law is not a bright line list of instructions for importers.
Therefore, the importer's initial entry determinations actually will re-
flect the importer's interpretation of what the law requires and allows.
Customs' responsibility in making its final determinations regarding
the importer's transaction will be to review the correctness and rea-
114 Id. See also supra note 43, at 102: "In meeting reasonable care, the Committee
believes that an importer should consider utilization of one or more of the following
aids to establish evidence of compliance... consulting [customs brokers, attorneys,
experts] who have experience and knowledge of customs laws, regulations,. and pro-
cedures" Id.
115 Id. at 637: "Under the new provision [ §1484], the importer will have responsi-
bility when providing the initial classification and appraisement. In the view of the
Committee, it is essential that this "shared responsibility" assure that at a minimum
"reasonable care" is used in discharging those activities for which the importer has
responsibility ... furnishing information sufficient to allow Customs to fix the final
classification and appraisal of merchandise." H.R. REP. No. 103-361, supra note 43,
at 136.
116 See 19 U.S.C. §1514 (administrative protest) and 19 U.S.C. §1618 (right to judi-
cial review of Customs decisions).
117 See H.R. REP. No. 103-361, supra note 43, at 106: "[t]he primary purpose of the
[Mod Act] is to streamline and automate the commercial operations of the U.S.
Customs Service."
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sonableness of the importer's initial determinations, 118 not just to ap-
ply the facts supplied by the importer to Customs' interpretation of
the law. Implicit under the Mod Act is the principle that Customs can-
not reject an importer's entry simply because Customs does not agree
with the importer's initial determinations. Instead, Customs must de-
termine whether the importer's determinations were allowed by the
law and, in those instances where Customs determines that they were
not, whether the importer's actions were reasonable.
The Mod Act's reform of the relationship between importer and
Customs will extend to judicial review. Rather than deciding whether
Customs properly applied the law to the importer's facts, the Court
now will have to determine whether the law allows the importer to do
what it did. The "presumption of correctness" standard should all but
disappear,11 9 because the issue will be the proper interpretation and
application of the law, not whether the importer accurately and truth-
fully disclosed all of the facts and whether Customs' application of
the law to those facts was correct. Although the right of judicial re-
view for both importers and Customs has existed for some time in the
United States, the Mod Act effectively puts the Court in a new posi-
tion: final arbiter in a debate between the importer and Customs.
118 "Correctness" refers to the "conduct, management and operation" by Customs
officers of the customs laws and a presumption that such officers have "acted
rightly" in carrying out their official duties. Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118, 122
(1877). "Reasonableness" concerns whether the importer that makes a mistake can
be penalized for the mistake. Under the standard of "reasonable care," an importer
may make a mistake, but cannot be penalized for that mistake if the actions of the
importer that led to the mistake were reasonable. 19 U.S.C. §1592, as amended.
Thus, in the post-Customs Modernization Act environment, Customs must make two
basic determinations for each transaction: whether the importer's initial determina-
tions were correct and, if not, whether the importer's actions were reasonable.
119 The U.S. Supreme Court is currently deciding a Customs case in which the "pre-
sumption of correctness" will be reviewed. United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.,
cert. granted, 141 L. Ed. 2d. 16 (1998). This standard which is. cited by Customs as
the basis for demanding judicial deference to administrative expertise has, in the
author's opinion, been much weaker for longer than Customs will acknowledge. The
presumption is nothing more than an evidentiary burden placed upon the party who
challenges Customs determinations. Anhydrides & Chemicals, Inc. v. United States,
130 F.3d 1481, 1486 (CAFC 1997). Indeed, it is well established that where there is
no factual dispute, Customs' presumption is "irrelevant." Rollerblade, Inc. v. United
States, 112 F.3d 481, 484 (CAFC 1997). It is notable that it is the Customs Service
that appealed the Haggar decision; however, the Supreme Court's interest may well
be nothing more than a desire to make clear the limitations on the amount of defer-
ence to which Customs is entitled, something that has been known to the courts and
the trade community for some time.
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In a Mod Act trade environment, the magnitude of the importer's
responsibility and opportunity should not be underestimated. Of equal
magnitude is the challenge for customs and regulated international
trade lawyers to appropriately counsel their trader clients. In dis-
charging their statutory obligations, traders must demonstrate an un-
derstanding of what the law requires. In discharging their responsibil-
ity to their owners (shareholders and investors), traders must demon-
strate an understanding of what the law allows. Expert legal counsel
will be indispensable to the trader. The new international trade envi-
ronment is one in which the law will continually evolve fed by the
dynamics of the efforts by both importer and Customs to keep their
relationship balanced. Customs and trade counsel will not only help
the law to evolve constructively, but will also help the trader keep its
share of balance: legal compliance and commercial effectiveness.
Traders should regard the Mod Act environment in the United
States as a prototype for the customs environments that will emerge in
WTO countries throughout the world.120  Traders must expect that
they will be assigned a substantive role in the legal determination as-
pects of the customs process in every jurisdiction in which they con-
duct business. The responsibility and opportunity should be relatively
the same everywhere. The trader that begins to adapt its knowledge
and experience of the U.S. Mod Act environment to its global opera-
tions will have a tremendous advantage over others.
Even if there were no Mod Act or WTO, traders would have little
option in the current world of international trade buit to "globalize"
their customs and regulated international trade operations. The princi-
ples of "common," applying the same processes and policies every-
where possible, and "lean," doing the most with the least, mandate
that traders maximize the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of their
trade business. An ad hoc, country-by-country approach to customs is
no longer tolerable from a business perspective, regardless of the
status of national customs regulatory regimes.
Fortunately, the Uruguay Round, WTO environment encourages
in effect traders to globalize their customs and trade activities. The
Mod Act is WTO-compliant national customs legislation. Therefore,
traders can apply the positions and strategies that they have employed
120 In fact, the United States was neither the first to reform its customs laws in this
way nor is it the only one currently implementing such measures. The European
Union has placed a responsibility on importers for initial entry decisions since at
least 1992. See generally Brussels Nomenclature, supra note 84. One of the an-
nounced purposes of the recent Customs reforms in Mexico was to place increased
responsibility upon importers. See generally Mexico: Trade Barriers, supra note 6.
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in the United States to other WTO jurisdictions with a great deal of
certainty and confidence. The deviations and differences should only
be minor. Further, the imprimatur of WTO conformity allows the
trader to take positions in another jurisdiction without first getting ap-
proval from the local Customs authorities. If a trader knows that a
particular position or practice is valid in one WTO jurisdiction, so
long as it is covered by one of the GATT Agreements or by WTO rule
or policy, the trader must be able to assume that the position or prac-
tice is valid in another WTO jurisdiction.
This will have enormous value to traders because it will reduce
the uncertainty and cost in global customs and trade operations.
Where there is conflict, the trader should have the opportunity to re-
solve those differences through administrative or judicial review in
either jurisdiction. Reliance, however, on the materials and precedents
of the WTO or World Customs Organization (WCO) committees
should expedite the issue resolution process. All of this is predicated
on the trader having a solid grasp of the legal bases for the practices
and strategies that it employs.
V. CONCLUSION
The Uruguay Round created an environment in which a global
body of customs and trade law is developing. In particular, the Uru-
guay Round ensured the ultimate harmonization of the overall cus-
toms process and the fundamental determinations that are made for all
goods crossing an international border: admissibility, classification,
and valuation. WTO membership and the underlying GATT Agree-
ments establish clear parameters within which all WTO members
must operate. These parameters restrict the ability to deviate from the
global standards. For those countries that do attempt to avoid WTO
obligations, peer pressure from other WTO members, the Dispute
Resolution process, and ultimately banishment from membership from
the WTO and its attendant benefits should be sufficient to deter most
potential rogues.121
121 An additional development that is on the periphery of this discussion, but never-
theless a very strong influence is the decreasing tolerance for incompetence and
corruption among national enforcement authorities, including Customs. U.S. traders
have been restricted from participating in or facilitating corruption by the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act since 1979. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq. Recently, the inter-
national community took a major step against the toleration of corruption in the
OECD Convention Against Bribery and Corruption. The 35 major industrialized
countries that comprise the OECD have committed themselves to enacting legisla-
tion that prohibits their nationals from participating in or allowing themselves to be
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For traders the opportunities of predictability, uniformity, and ef-
ficiencies should outweigh the cost and burden of increased responsi-
bility. Although traders will have to develop a minimum understand-
ing and facility in the legal aspects of customs and regulated interna-
tional trade law, they will benefit from the ability to develop common,
globally applicable positions and strategies. Not only will a widget be
a widget everywhere the trader trades, but a purchasing commission
will be deductible from dutiable value in all jurisdictions. The sooner
traders implement common, knowledgeable customs and regulated
international trade programs, the sooner they will realize its benefits.
The three great barriers to a true global trade system will be dis-
mantled and replaced by a harmonized WTO environment. The only
question is how soon? Even this question can be answered by the
trader. Just as it has been the trader who brings new goods to new
markets, so it will be the post-Uruguay Round trader that will bring
the new law and standards to new jurisdictions. An evolving and vital
global body of customs and trade law will emerge as the balanced re-
lationship between traders and customs authorities becomes estab-
lished in all WTO jurisdictions. Competent customs and regulated in-
ternational trade counsel, who must follow their trader clients wher-
ever they go, will be a critical element to this overall equation.
The Uruguay Round laid out all of the necessary elements for a
global trade system. Now, it is for the players-customs authorities, the
judiciaries, traders, and counsel-to make the system work.
involved in corrupt practices in their international conduct of business. See, e.g.,
Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level 38 (OECD News Release May 27,
1997) (visited on Nov. 28, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org> (document search). The
purpose of these laws is to kill the perpetuation of bribery and corruption by de-
priving the private sector of realizing its supposed benefits.
Where traders can be criminally prosecuted in their home jurisdictions for en-
gaging in corrupt practices abroad, or, at least, cannot take advantage of corrupt
practices by taking tax deductions for bribes paid, it is expected that the foreign
authorities will be forced to abandon their demands for bribes and the like.
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